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After the 1989 Tiananmen protests, Chinese student activism has become a popular 
topic among Western scholars. In retrospect, 1989 was the final climax of student movements 
in twentieth-century China. This paper examines the beginning of student activism in the 
People’s Republic period by focusing on the activities of Beijing University students during 
the Hundred Flowers Campaign in 1957. The students commonly referred to their movement 
as the “May 19th Movement,” the date when the first “big character poster” appeared on 
campus, as their own way of responding to the Party’s call to “Let a Hundred Flowers 
Bloom, and Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend.” The Beijing University student 
movement lasted barely half a month, and was soon repressed in the nation-wide Anti-
Rightist Campaign, when the most outspoken students were punished as “rightists.” The 
questions this essay addresses are the following: What events and motivations triggered this 
movement? How did the movement develop and wither over this short period? How do 
participants and the Party reflect on the movement today? And what is its lasting significance 
in the history of dissent in contemporary China? 
In answering these questions, the paper is organized into three chapters. The first 
chapter situates the Hundred Flowers Movement in historical perspective, and specifically 
looks at domestic as well as international background, and how the repression of the Hundred 
Flowers Movement foreshadowed a series of political and social catastrophes in the Maoist 
period. The second chapter delves into the student movement and applies analytical 
frameworks of social movement theories to this particular case, especially in terms of 
repertoires of protests, organization and leadership, framing of dissent, and how political 
opportunities and constraints operated at various points throughout the movement. The third 
chapter explores both the official reevaluation of the Anti-Rightist Campaign in the post-Mao 




movement after nearly half a century of silence and oblivion. Through this discussion of 
historical memory and construction, I will conclude with an analysis of the factors that 







Chapter 1: The Hundred Flowers Movement in Historical Perspective 
 
 
The Beijing University student movement in 1957 did not happen by chance. It was a 
response to the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1956-1957, which aimed at mobilizing 
intellectual opinions and support for the Party’s policies. Both domestic and international 




The Hundred Flowers Campaign occurred between January 1956 and early June 1957 
when Mao Zedong launched a series of “liberal” policies to loosen the Communist Party’s 
control over the intellectuals.1 The term came from one of Mao’s speeches in 1956, when he 
raised the slogan “Let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend.” 
The category of intellectuals ranged from scientists to writers and artists. The total number of 
people categorized as “intellectuals” was relatively small: 3,840,000 including 100,000 
“higher” intellectuals.2 Among them, Mao particularly aimed at non-Communist Party 
politicians and intellectuals, thus creating a channel for them to criticize Party bureaucratism 
from the outside. Non-party members also happened to “constitute a large proportion of the 
country’s managerial and technical experts.”3  
One reason for Mao to launch the Hundred Flowers was to gain the intellectuals’ 
enthusiasm and talents to contribute to the first Five Year Plan. This was an intensive 
program for modernizing China, based on the Soviet economic model. It stressed 
industrialization and agricultural collectivization. Granted a degree of freedom and criticism, 
the intellectuals were expected to actively participate in the Party’s plans.   
                                                        
1 Roderick MacFarquhar, ed. The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap 
Forward, Harvard contemporary China series 6 (Cambridge, Mass: Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard University, 
1989), 4 
2 MacFarquhar, ed. The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 5 




On May 2nd, 1956, Mao officially announced the policy “let a hundred flowers bloom, 
let a hundred schools contend” at the Supreme State Conference.4 He claimed the policy was 
a guideline to developing sciences and arts. The phrase “a hundred schools contend” 
reminded people of the Spring and Autumn (722 – 481 B.C.) and of the Warring States (403 
– 221 B.C.) periods of ancient Chinese history, when the Hundred Schools of Thought of 
Chinese philosophy blossomed. Among them, the most influential schools such as 
Confucianism, Taoism and Legalism were founded. Now Mao strived to use the historical 
allusion to suggest wide-ranging debates. 
Three weeks later, on May 26, 1956, the Director of the Central Committee’s 
Propaganda Department, Lu Dingyi, gave a speech specifically to the intellectuals, which 
elaborated some main themes of the policy. He clarified the various aspects of freedom the 
policy sought: “freedom of independent thinking, of debate, of creative works; freedom to 
criticize and freedom to express, and to maintain and reserve one’s opinion on questions of 
art, literature, or scientific research.”5 However, these “freedoms,” as he stressed, should only 
be restricted to the people, and “no freedom should be extended to counterrevolutionaries: for 
them we have only dictatorship.”6 There was a strict distinction “between the battle of ideas 
among the people and the struggle against counterrevolutionaries.”7 His words seemed 
positive and encouraging, but nobody knew where the line between friend and foe began, or 
how to tell the difference between the struggle among the people and the struggle against 
counterrevolutionaries. As MacFarquhar writes, “the party retained the right to define where 
the boundary line between the people and counterrevolutionaries should be drawn and who 
                                                        
4 MacFarquhar,. ed. The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 6 
5 Hualing Nie, ed. Literature of the Hundred Flowers, Modern Asian literature series (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1981), 23-24. 
6 Ibid., 24. 




fell into which category.”8 The seemingly liberal wind had the potential to be reversed, 
because the party held the power to interpret its policies according to its own wishes. 
The intellectuals’ initial response toward the policy was lukewarm and cautious. 
Traditionally, only rich families could afford a good education for their children, and 
advanced education aimed at government employment. Therefore, intellectuals had long been 
classified as bourgeois class members, and they were required to reform their thinking in 
order to serve socialist China.  In the 1950s, most intellectuals were reluctant to air 
grievances because of their bitter past experiences, such as self-criticism sessions during the 
ideological remolding campaign in 1951, and more recently the outcomes of two campaigns 
aimed at them. The first was the “Anti-Hu Feng” campaign in the summer of 1955 criticizing 
and attacking the prominent left-wing author and literary theorist who had challenged Mao’s 
vision of revolutionary literature. After Hu’s fall and imprisonment, came the “Su Fan” 
campaign – the Movement for the Liquidation of Counterrevolutionaries, which was also 
targeted in part at intellectuals.  
With this history, intellectuals were unwilling to raise any opposition to the Party. 
According to a professor at Beijing Normal University speaking during these years,  
The intellectuals ... are still not free from misgivings and fear that they 
might be trapped. They fear that, once their idealistic thoughts appear in 
print, they might be required to undergo the process of rectification 
once again in the future . . . they fear that they would be criticized and 
suffer the loss of prestige and face once their views are found to be 
unsatisfactory. As a result they have not the courage to contend 
although they very much want to do so.9  
 
After repeated campaigns aimed at reforming the intellectuals, the Hundred Flowers 
was framed as the first major liberalization since the founding of People’s Republic in 
                                                        
8 MacFarquhar, ed. The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 7. 
9 René Goldman, “The Rectification Campaign at Peking University: May-June 1957,” The China Quarterly, no. 12 




1949.10 Some people had learned the lesson from previous campaigns and remained silent 
this time, while others believed that this time would be different. 
In February 1957, Mao gave an important speech at the Supreme State Conference, On 
the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People. The published version of June 
1957 was quite different from the original notes, which indicates how the political 
atmosphere changed within months. In April, as a further push to the Hundred Flowers 
policy, the Party initiated a Rectification Campaign aimed at leadership failures, which 
finally convinced the intellectuals to air their grievance. This was when the student 
movement at Beijing University arose. Only three weeks later, Mao felt the criticisms had 
gotten out of hand, and brought a halt to the liberal period through the Anti-Rightist 
Movement. Not only were many intellectuals’ and students’ lives changed for the worse, the 
state suffered from decades of human disasters for the rest of Maoist period. 
 
International Crises and Mao’s Response 
 
Outside of China, the year of 1956 was eventful, especially in Soviet Union and East 
European communist countries. In February 1956, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev gave a 
speech to the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) entitled “On the 
Personality Cult and its Consequences.” He repudiated Stalin’s personality cult and the 
ruthlessness of the purges of the military and the Party.11 Khrushchev’s supposedly “Secret 
Speech” was leaked to the Western world within a short time, which caused immense shock, 
confusion and a questioning of the world Communist movement. 
Not all countries reacted to the “Secret Speech” peacefully. In June 1956, Polish 
workers demonstrated in Poznan, but the government soon put down the protests. In October, 
the government appointed the reformist Gomulka to negotiate with the Soviet government, 
                                                        
10 Merle Goldman, “Mao’s Obsession with the Political Role of Literature and the Intellectuals”, in MacFarquhar, ed. The 
Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 39 





and thus ended the era of Stalinization in Poland, initiating a policy of modest liberalization. 
More violence occurred in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Only two days after the 
“Polish October,” the students and intellectuals organized a demonstration in Budapest 
“demanding free elections and the removal of Soviet forces.”12 The revolt evolved into 
battles between the revolutionaries and the State Security forces along with Soviet troops. 
Eventually the U.S.S.R. established a new government in Hungary and suppressed public 
opposition.   
The “Secret Speech” became widely known in China even though the Party never 
officially published it. It was translated into a brochure and attached to the periodical 
Reference Material, with a notice: “internal publication, please preserve.” Any student could 
order Reference Material because Mao decreed that its publication increase from 2000 to 
400,000 copies. Besides that, the New York Daily Worker published the “Secret Speech” and 
this newspaper was sold at the foreign language bookstore in Beijing. Soon it was sold out 
since many university students in Beijing sought copies.13 Two students and a teacher’s 
assistant at Beijing University later translated the report from the newspaper and shared it 
among the students,14 who later were charged as “rightists” for translating and spreading the 
report. 
Mao’s reaction to the speech was ambivalent. As he put it, Khrushchev “tore off the lid 
and poked a hole.”15 Later on, he explained his attitudes toward the “Secret Speech” in the 
talk On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People: “To expose the cult of 
Stalin, to tear off the lid, to liberate people, this is a liberation movement; but his [i.e., 
Khrushchev’s] method of exposing [Stalin] is incorrect; [he] hasn’t made a good analysis, 
                                                        
12MacFarquhar, ed. The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 8 
13 Li Shenzhi, “Mao zhuxi shi shenme shihou jueding yin she chu dong de?” in Niu Han and Deng Jiuping, eds. Liuyue xue: 
ji yizhong de fa youpai yundong, 1st ed. (Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe, 1998), 117. 
14 Chen Fengxiao, Wo suo zhidao de Beida zhengfeng fanyou yundong, in Ji Xianlin, ed. Meiyou qingjie de gushi, 1st ed., 
Suiyue wencong (Beijing: Beijing shiyue wenyi chubanshe, 2001), 503. 




clubbing [him] to death with a single blow.”16 On the one hand, Mao acknowledged the basic 
points of Khrushchev’s report, which implied that not everything Stalin did was correct; he 
felt relieved that he no longer had to follow whatever Stalin did. On the other hand, Mao 
worried about the way Khrushchev attacked Stalin posthumously and the problem of 
personality cult. For a long time, Mao assumed himself to be China’s Stalin, and therefore the 
criticism of Stalin was just like a denial of Mao’s power. In the 1950s, Mao gradually 
developed his personality cult through propaganda, but people seemed to buy into it and 
rarely questioned it. During the Hundred Flowers Campaign, however, some active students 
explicitly associated the personality cult with the socialist system, even if they did not extend 
the problem to Mao. However, Mao was still paranoid of the idea of being criticized after his 
death, and thus he tried all means to get rid of his political rivals in various campaigns when 
he was still alive.  
Mao publicly expressed his opinions on the “Secret Speech” through an editorial in the 
People’s Daily on April 5, 1956, entitled On the Historical Experience of the Proletarian 
Dictatorship.17 It acknowledged the mistakes of Stalin, and emphasized evaluating Stalin 
from a historical perspective. At the conclusion, Mao wrote,  
Now it is time to thank Khrushchev for tearing off the lid, and we 
should consider from every aspect how to act according to the Chinese 
situations, and no longer be superstitious. … Now [we] should work 
harder to search for a concrete path to construct socialism in China.18  
 
In other words, in learning a lesson from the Soviet Union, China should find its own 
path to build socialism, instead of copying the Soviet model. Since this editorial came out 
before the launching of the Hundred Flowers policy, the latter can be read as an endeavor to 
develop Chinese socialism without Soviet influence.19 Although the Hundred Flowers 
                                                        
16 MacFarquhar, ed. The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 178. 
17 Ibid., 6. 
18 Qian, Jujue Yiwang, 113. 




Campaign was targeted toward domestic intellectuals, it was affected by and came partly in 
response to international changes. 
Besides Khrushchev’s speech, the Hungarian Revolution also had multiple impacts on 
Mao. As he commented on this incident: 
Do you think the Hungarian incident was good or bad? I say [it] was 
both good and bad. Of course it was bad, since they had disturbances. 
But Hungary did one very good thing; the counterrevolutionaries really 
helped us. Since the end of the Hungarian incident, things have been 
more secure than before. Hungary now is better than the Hungary of the 
past when there were no disturbances.20  
 
First, it reinforced Mao’s distrust of the intellectuals, who “could under some 
circumstances prove to be enormously dangerous.”21 His constant reference to Khrushchev’s 
denunciation of Stalin and the Hungarian upheaval signaled his concern that similar incidents 
could happen in China.22 Second, Mao still believed that different from the Hungarian 
intellectuals, their Chinese counterparts “‘basically’ accepted the system and were basically 
patriotic – basically, ‘part of the people.’”23 The differences between the two countries’ 
intellectuals were more important than their similarities. Third, in order to prevent a 
Hungarian-like uprising from taking place in China, Mao tried “liberal” methods instead of 
repression and violence.24 The Hungarian uprising was positive, as long as it did not happen 
in China. Maybe Mao did not believe that a similar case would ever occur in China, thus he 
insisted on calling on non-Party members to criticize the Party in the Hundred Flowers.25 
After the Hungarian Revolution, Mao wrote another editorial More on the Historical 
Experience of the Proletarian Dictatorship, which was published on December 29, 1956. In 
contrast with the earlier editorial, Mao not only emphasized the achievements of Stalin, but 
                                                        
20 MacFarquhar, ed. The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 177 
21 Benjamin Schwartz, “Thoughts on the Late Mao: Between Total Redemption and Utter Frustration,” in MacFarquhar, ed. 
The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 27. 
22 Goldman, in MacFarquhar, ed. The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 46 
23 Schwartz, in MacFarquhar, ed. The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 27 
24 Goldman, in MacFarquhar, ed. The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 46 




also warned of the appearance of anti-Soviet and anti-socialist tendencies.26 He rejected 
Tito’s recent speech, which claimed that Stalinism was not a problem of personality cult, but 
“an inevitable outgrowth of the Soviet system.”27 Mao pointed out that Stalin’s mistakes were 
not caused by the socialist system, and in order to correct these mistakes, it would be 
unnecessary to “correct” the socialist system.28 Later on during the student movement, the 
relationship between personality cult and the socialist system became a heatedly discussed 
topic on college campuses. Furthermore he criticized those so-called “socialists,” who spoke 
highly of democracy without connecting it with the dictatorship of the proletariat. He 
denounced those as bourgeois who opposed the proletariat, and demanded capitalism instead 
of socialism.29 Many intellectuals could not fathom Mao’s undertone here until they were 
labeled as “rightists” for promoting democracy.  
 
Fragrant Flowers or Poisonous Weeds 
 
On February 27, 1957, Mao gave an important speech, On the Correct Handling of 
Contradictions among the People, to an extended session of the Supreme State Conference. 
For unknown reasons, the transcript was not published until June 18 of the same year, when 
the Anti-Rightist Campaign had already begun.30 Meanwhile, the speech “was only 
commented on and interpreted at different levels, inside and outside the Party,”31 but the 
political atmosphere had switched from liberalization to repression since June. Mao’s original 
speaking notes are translated in The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, and the published 
version is translated in The Literature of the Hundred Flowers. Comparing the two versions 
of the same speech, one can see many significant changes, such the length from 28,000 
                                                        
26 Qian, Jujue yiwang, 114 
27 MacFarquhar, ed. The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 9 
28 Qian, Jujue yiwang, 114 
29 Ibid. 
30 See footnotes from “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People,” in Nie, ed. Literature of the Hundred 
Flowers, 13. 




characters to 24,000,32 in the tone from soft to harsh, in focus from encouraging critiques to 
listing criteria to fulfill. All verbal changes reflected the shift of political orientation within a 
few months. 
In the original notes, Mao used the Hu Feng campaign to talk about constructive 
thoughts and counterrevolutionary thoughts, which were described as flowers and weeds 
respectively. He differentiated Hu Feng’s case from others and encouraged people to 
“cultivate that little flower.” As he said, 
He [Hu Feng] organized a secret group; that’s not good. So long as you 
do not run secret groups, you [Hu Feng types] can cultivate that little 
flower; [since] China’s area is so big, nine million square kilometers, 
what’s so serious about this little flower blooming? Cultivate that little 
flower for everybody to see, [and] people can also criticize flowers like 
his, saying I don’t like your flower. [We’re] talking about weeds and 
fragrant flowers. Some are poisonous weeds. If you want only grain, 
want only barley, wheat, corn, rice, millet, and absolutely don’t want 
any weeds, that’s unachievable. … To ban all weeds, not allowing their 
growth, is that possible? In reality it is not; they will still grow, [and] 
you will still have to hoe [to get rid of them]. … But in reality so many 
weeds compete with grain, [and] among them are poisonous weeds.33  
 
Mao was aware that, as long as he allowed people to speak out, or “cultivate flowers,” 
weeds would naturally come out as well. He mentioned the notions of “fragrant flowers” and 
“poisonous weeds,” but there were no concrete definitions of the two, nor did he give a 
solution to get rid of weeds.  Instead, he gave an example: “Stalin in the past was 100 percent 
a fragrant flower; Khrushchev in one stroke turned him into a poisonous weed. Now [Stalin] 
is again fragrant.”34 In other words, fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds were 
exchangeable, depending on who played the role of judge. Mao disliked Khrushchev’s 
judgment of Stalin, though he did not explicitly say that Khrushchev was a 
counterrevolutionary. 
In this document, Mao was aware of student activism, as he quoted some statistics that 
                                                        
32 See footnotes, in MacFarquhar, ed. The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 132. 
33 MacFarquhar,ed. The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 165. 




“last year [1956] among universities and middle schools in 28 cities there were reportedly 
over 7,000 students involved in disturbances in 29 schools.”35 Rather than blaming the 
students, he agreed with the analysis that  
The cause of the disturbances was nothing more than bureaucratism [by 
leaders] and student naïveté; youth, workers, [and] students did not 
understand the complexity of the world, did not understand arduous 
struggle. At the same time, the school authorities [and] the 
administrators used various methods to deceive them [and] didn’t share 
weal and woe with them.36 
 
Mao treated the students as immature children, who could not mobilize themselves on 
their own, but as having been deceived by the school officials. He did not believe students 
could cause disturbances on their own, which explained why the student movement in 1957 
shocked him. In dealing with these disturbances, instead of punishment, Mao claimed that 
there was a lack of enforcement of political studies, thus the Party failed to lead people’s 
minds and behaviors. As he said, 
There are counterrevolutionaries, but they are very few. [We] can’t say 
that these agitators are mainly counterrevolutionaries. On the contrary, 
it is mainly the defects in our work: We don’t know how to educate, we 
don’t know how to lead. … Make the process of the disturbance serve 
as an educational process, serve as a political course. Our political work 
has been insufficient, [our] ideological work hasn’t been done well; 
[this is] bureaucratism. [We] must look upon strikes, student strikes, 
[and] the peasants waving their poles as the process of remolding our 
work, [and] educating workers [and] students.37  
 
Mao thought that counterrevolutionaries were the minority, but there was no specific 
standard to distinguish who really was a counterrevolutionary. Mao highlighted the 
responsibility of education on ideological work, about which he had earlier said that self-
remolding needed to be further emphasized among youth and the intellectuals.38  
Mao’s encouragement of criticism was evident in the original draft, but not much so in 
the revised version. Most important, the published speech added a list of six criteria to 
                                                        
35 MacFarquhar, ed. The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 174. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 175, 176. 




distinguish between fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds: 
1. Words and actions should help to unite, and not divide, the people 
of our various nationalities. 
2. They should be beneficial, and not harmful, to socialist 
transformation and socialist construction.   
3. They should help to consolidate, and not undermine or weaken, the 
people’s democratic dictatorship. 
4. They should help to consolidate, and not undermine or weaken, 
democratic centralism. 
5. They should help to strengthen, and not discard or weaken, the 
leadership of the Communist Party. 
6. They should be beneficial, and not harmful, to international 
socialist unity and the unity of the peace-loving people of the world.39 
 
Among these criteria, the socialist path and Party leadership were the most important 
principles to follow.40 That is to say, socialism and the Party’s legitimacy were not open to 
criticism, even though all kinds of criticisms were welcomed. Different from the first draft, 
the revised version took a harder line in terms of “wrong” ideas: “it certainly would not be 
right to refrain from criticism, to look on while wrong ideas spread unchecked and allow 
them to monopolize the field. Mistakes must be criticized and poisonous weeds fought 
wherever they crop up.”41 However, incorrect ideas were not to be banned or deprived their 
freedom of speech, for “it is only by employing the method of discussion, criticism, and 
reasoning that we can really foster correct ideas and overcome wrong ones, and that we can 
really settle issues.”42 Ironically, Mao stated that “it is harmful to the growth of art and 
science if administrative measures are used to impose one particular style of art or school of 
thought and to ban another,”43 which was exactly what was done in the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign. 
In the revised version, the intellectuals were placed in the same category as the 
bourgeoisie who came from the old society, but it also recognized that they “are patriotic and 
                                                        
39 MacFarquhar, ed. The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao,  165. 
40 Ibid., 156 
41 Nie, ed. Literature of the Hundred Flowers, 17. 
42 Ibid., 16 




are willing to serve their flourishing socialist motherland; they know they will be helpless 
and have no bright future to look forward to if they turn away from the socialist cause and 
from the working people led by the Communist Party.”44 It had an undertone that the 
intellectuals would certainly cooperate with the state either because of genuine patriotism or 
lack of alternatives.45 For this group of people, suppression should not be pursued, but rather 
allowing them to express their ideas, arguing with them, and directing appropriate criticism at 
them was the appropriate method.46 The text leads to the conclusion, which only became 
obvious in the Anti-Rightist Campaign, that the intellectuals could not escape being criticized 
no matter what they would say.  
As a continuation of the Hundred Flowers, on April 27, 1957, the Central Committee 
announced “the instructions on the Rectification Campaign,” which was published in 
People’s Daily on May 1st. Consistent with the Hundred Flowers policy, and intended to 
further push the liberal line, the principle of the campaign was, “Speak all you know and 
speak it fully; no fault will be attached to the speaker, while the listeners will learn a lesson 
thereof.”47 It aimed to fight bureaucratism, sectarianism and subjectivism, which were 
summarized as the “three evils” in the “style of work” among Party cadres, and the slogan of 
the campaign was “Unity-Criticism-Unity.”48 Rectification of work style was among Mao’s 
favorite methods previously utilized in 1942 and 1950 in order to unite the Party leadership. 
This time, it invited democratic parties’ members to help the Party eradicate the “three evils,” 
and thus it was called an “open-door rectification,” which distinguished itself from the other 
two intra-Party movements.49  
                                                        
44 Nie, ed. Literature of the Hundred Flowers, 15 
45 MacFarquhar, ed. The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 30 
46 Nie, ed. Literature of the Hundred Flowers, 16 
47 Goldman, “The Rectification Campaign at Peking University,” 141 
48 Nie, ed.  Literature of the Hundred Flowers, 18. 




René Goldman, a foreign exchange student at Beijing University from 1953 to 1958,50 
revealed another detail, which could not be found in the published text. According to him, the 
instructions warned that the Rectification Campaign “must be earnest and yet like a mild 
breeze and a thin rain; meetings should be limited to small groups of a few people and 
assume the form of comradely talks.”51 This instruction meant that criticism should not be 
bold but be kept within limits, which left enough space to reinterpret what was counted as 
breeze and drizzle. The intellectuals might not catch these words or fully understand the 
meanings behind them, but at least the Rectification Campaign could sweep away their 
doubts and concerns. As Mao anticipated, the intellectuals, especially non-Party members, 
finally began to speak openly. The “airing” period lasted only a short time, before the Anti-
Rightist Campaign was launched in June 1957.  
The Anti-Rightist Campaign silenced the intellectuals and non-Party politicians who 
had different opinions of the Party leadership and socialism, even though these people were 
invited to voice their grievance. From then on, no one dared to raise any opposition to Mao 
and challenge Party policies. It was not only the fear of repression that discouraged people 
from speaking the truth, but the Party system itself, which had no reliable channels to hear 
opinions from the bottom. Thus Mao held absolute power to carry out whatever he had in 
mind. Mao later launched the Great Leap Forward in 1958, which caused severe famine for 
three consecutive years, and eventually the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) at his own will. 
Mao himself felt the lack of checks and balances as well, as he said at a conference in 1962, 
“when the rightists attack, you have to fight back, or what else can you do? But the downside 
is that people no longer dare to speak out.”52 It was indeed the consequence of the Anti-
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Rightist Campaign summed up in one sentence. This was the movement that foreshadowed a 





Chapter 2: May 19th Student Movement at Beijing University 
 
 
The Hundred Flowers policy brought the liberal wind to Beijing University, a school 
famous for its student activism in twentieth century China. The first big character poster 
supporting the movement appeared on May 19, 1957, igniting the students’ enthusiasm for 
participating in the Rectification Campaign. Besides putting up posters, the students held 
speeches, debates, and even published journals. The most active students gathered to form a 
loosely organized group “The Hundred Flowers Society,” and made efforts to publish their 
own journal “The Square.” They viewed themselves as a grassroots democratic movement 
answering the Party’s call. However, the Party saw their actions as attacks and considered the 
students to be counterrevolutionaries. Though the students reacted to political opportunities 
granted by the Party, they did not realize that the Party had the power to withdraw these 
opportunities and impose constraints at any time. Consequently, the movement resulted in a 
tragic ending.  
 
Beijing University before the Movement  
 
As the cradle of the May Fourth Movement in 1919, Beijing University is well known 
for its democratic tradition and student activism. The May Fourth Movement was symbolized 
by student demonstrations that gathered at Tiananmen Square, protesting against the weak 
government and the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles that undermined China’s 
sovereignty. All subsequent student movements framed themselves as following the tradition 
of 1919, and continuing a new May Fourth Movement, though none of them are equivalent 
on the same scale until 1989.  
After the triumph of the Communists in 1949, the university’s autonomy and academic 
freedoms were limited. Party organizations took control over all levels of university life. 




from Columbia University, “the real power was concentrated in the hands of the vice-
presidents and the assistant-deans who were Party members.”53 The Party’s leadership in the 
university was one of the most controversial issues debated among students during the 
student movement. 
In the 1950s, access to university education expanded greatly. As for Beijing 
University, “by 1958 it had grown into an enormous institution of nearly 10,000 students, a 
five- or six-fold increase as compared with 1952, with at least twelve departments and a large 
number of foreign students.”54 Besides the increasing number of the students, the 
composition of the student body was reshaped, with a rising percentage of students from 
peasant and worker origins. As the statistics indicated, “this percentage was about 19 per cent 
in 1954 and probably about 35 per cent in 1958.”55  
However, Mao had not kept up with the recent changes at universities. When he spoke 
at a conference with provincial Party leaders, he assumed that “our university students, 
according to the Beijing municipal government, are mostly descendents of landlords, rich 
peasants, or the bourgeois class. The students from proletarian background and poor peasant 
families are less than twenty percent. It might be the case nationwide.”56 The misjudgment 
partly explains Mao’s worries about the students’ class backgrounds, and it also helps explain 
why he would overestimate the severity of the situation when the students participated in the 
campaign of criticism.  
The Hundred Flowers policy affected Beijing University in a variety of ways. As René 
Goldman reported,  
The curriculum for the academic year 1956-57 was lightened, the 
number of meetings was greatly reduced and the teaching was 
liberalized to the point that even seminars were organized. These 
seminars however did not go much beyond formal discussions. The 
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Marxist-Leninist Weltanschauung was not subject to controversial 
discussion.57  
 
In another article, René Goldman detailed how the seminar was conducted under the 
professor’s guidance, but he also pointed out that “the very fact that debates were held 
constituted a marked improvement.”58 Before 1957, campus life remained academic and 
peaceful, except for the “Anti-Hu Feng” campaign and the following “Movement for the 
Liquidation of Counter-Revolutionaries” in the summer of 1955.59 
During the Hundred Flowers Campaign, Mao mainly anticipated politicians and 
intellectuals from democratic parties would speak out rather than the students. There were 
eight minor democratic parties that already existed before 1949, and continued under 
Communist Party guidance. Their members included a large number of intellectuals, 
especially scientific and technological intellectuals. Most studies of this period have focused 
on their criticisms of the Party and socialism. The students were not expected to participate in 
the movement, and the sources on student participation are rare. Nevertheless, the students 
were different from non-Party politicians. Sometimes their criticisms were more vehement 
than the older intellectuals, and they touched on a wide range of issues, from their first job 
assignment after graduation to the nature of socialism in China. They questioned the principle 
of Party leadership and demanded limits on Party authority. Such issues were far beyond the 
boundary of “breeze and drizzle,” and could be regarded as “poisonous weeds.” As René 
Goldman pointed out, “What really shook the Party was a feeling that it faced the loss of its 
control over the youth. Young people brought up under Communist rule had become the 
loudest in denouncing the Party which had vested its hopes in them.”60  
Mao not only worried about losing the students, but also about the potential spread of 
the student movement from Beijing University to other campuses. Another trend Mao was 
                                                        
57 Goldman, “Peking University Today,” 105. 
58 Goldman, “The Rectification Campaign at Peking University,” 139. 
59 Goldman, “Peking University Today,” 102. 




frightened would grow out of proportion was “the widespread distribution of these ideas 
outside the schools,” which might connect the students with the broad masses and provoke 
far-reaching consequences.61 He may have feared a Hungarian-type uprising.62  
Though the students raised harsh criticisms of the Party, they were not immune to 
Chinese Communist indoctrination. They trusted Mao, and they were pro-Socialist, anti-
Nationalist, anti-imperialist and anti-Stalin. Their thoughts “can be viewed as courageous 
attempts at free thought, but within essentially Socialist limits.”63 The students exercised their 
critical thinking and spoke in a different way from the Party, but they could not avoid being 
influenced by how they were educated.  
 
Repertoires of the Movement 
 
1. Big character Posters 
This section explores the repertoires students utilized during the movement, specifically 
in terms of big character posters, speeches, debates and journals. Students were familiar with 
some of the tactics, but the big character poster was carried over from the Nationalist period, 
which had been invisible since 1949. It was a creation attributed to the students at Beijing 
University. During the movement, people all over Beijing would come to visit and check out 
these posters, and daily visitors would reach over ten thousand.64 Mao in 1958 praised them 
as “an extremely useful new weapon,” “a revolutionary form created by the masses,” “a form 
of the mass struggle” and “a form to the advantage of the proletariat and to the disadvantage 
of the bourgeoisie.”65 The big character posters were widely seen in later political 
movements. However, the students were later punished as “rightists” for the content of their 
big character posters during the Hundred Flowers Campaign.  
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On May 19, 1957, the first big character poster appeared on the east wall of the main 
dining hall at Beijing University. Written in black on red paper, the poster was noticeable to 
passersby. It asked how the university had selected representatives to the third national 
conference of the new democratic Youth League.66 According to the Youth League 
principles, their members should select representatives, but nobody knew who those 
representatives were.67 Before the question had been answered, people’s attention was shifted 
to the second poster with “an audacious suggestion” to establish a democratic forum or a 
democracy wall, in order to help the Rectification Campaign.68 The idea of a democracy wall 
as a space for free speech reappeared in Beijing in 1978 after more than twenty years, but 
people did not credit the idea to the Beijing University students of the Hundred Flowers 
period. 
Overnight the walls of the dining halls, the classrooms and the dorms were covered 
with big character posters. By the afternoon on the second day, there were altogether 162 
posters.69 The number grew by the day. On May 22, “the number of posters was 264 at 11 
a.m. and grew to 317 by 7 p.m.”70 Posters displayed were full of variety: “long-winded 
articles, short essays, miscellaneous prose, poetry, cartoons, and serialized novels.”71 Some 
signed their real names and others pseudonyms, some signed their identification card 
numbers, and some remained anonymous. René Goldman made an acute observation about 
the chaotic scene: 
It seemed as if the Party had every critical poster surrounded by many 
others stating the Party viewpoint and attacking the criticizers. Those 
posters which raised controversial issues usually attracted gatherings of 
students who reacted to their content by scribbling on these very posters 
brief remarks.72  
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Posters instantaneously created an atmosphere of free speech and inspired discussions 
among the students. They might not necessarily agree with what was written on the posters, 
but at least it was provocative enough to see what their peers thought. The postings reached a 
climax by the afternoon of May 20, when a poem entitled “It Is the Right Time” was posted. 
It contained what became a widely quoted phrase: “My poem is a torch, which burns all 
barriers in the world. Its radiance cannot be masked, because the fire comes from the May 
Fourth.”73 It was probably the first time that the students compared themselves to the events 
of 1919, when students initiated a patriotic movement against feudalism, which the Beijing 
warlord government represented, and imperialism, meaning the Western powers who granted 
areas of Shandong province to Japan without considering China’s sovereignty. Such 
comparison caused controversy, as some students found resonance with the poem because 
they experienced “a similar sense of liberalization from the oppressions of the past and a 
similar feeling of freedom and power to strike out against established orthodoxies and 
institutions.”74  Some other students thought the poem was exaggerating the parallels and the 
current order should be maintained.75 They asked in response: “What is the time? Is it the 
time to tear down socialism?”76 For them, it seemed inappropriate to make parallels between 
a moment in national crisis and the one in socialist order. 
Simultaneously, a senior physics student Tan Tianrong started his series of posters all 
entitled “poisonous weeds,” which reminded people of Mao’s speech differentiating them 
from “fragrant flowers.” He even signed his signature as “a strong and wicked guy” to 
express his confidence and challenge to the authorities. He admitted that in doing so he meant 
to attract people’s attention, and he intentionally used some extreme words,77 but he also 
                                                        
73 Guo Luoji, Lishi de xuanwo, 181.  
74 Meisner, Mao's China and After, 187. 
75 Goldman, “The Rectification Campaign at Peking University,” 149. 
76 Guo, Lishi de xuanwo, 192. 
77 Tan Tianrong, “Save the soul,” in Niu Han and Deng Jiuping, eds. Yuanshang cao: jiyi zhong de fan youpai yundong 




believed that what he said was correct and a real “fragrant flower,” even though people might 
view it as a “poisonous weed.”78  
In Tan’s first “poisonous weed,” he sarcastically criticized the traditional standards of 
good students, as he wrote: 
Besides those 'Three-Good Students' (or morons, model students,' small 
nails' or 'sons and daughters of Mao Tse-tung' or whatever you call 
them, it's just the same) who have annihilated their thinking faculties, 
there are still among Chinese youth thousands of talented and 
remarkable persons.79 
 
“Three-Good Students” refers to excellence in morality, intellect and physicality, the 
standards to cultivate well-rounded students even till today. Here Tan mocked such standards 
as training students to obediently follow the Party, and real talented students were not 
included in the same category. If the first poster just gave people a taste of Tan’s style, the 
second “poisonous weed” was more critically focused on the Party. He wrote,  
The masses believe that everything the Party does is correct, and in any 
situation the Party is correct. If non-Party members raise different 
opinions, that must be wrong, that should not be allowed to exist, that 
should be punished and suppressed, until they make satisfactory self-
criticism.80  
 
Here he pointed out the myth of the always-correct Party, and the logic that different 
opinions from the Party were equal to anti-Party, anti-socialism and anti-revolution 
viewpoints.81 The same logic was applied in each political movement till the death of Mao. In 
the Cultural Revolution, the myth of the Party developed into the personality cult, and 
absolute loyalty to the Party turned into the absolute loyalty to Mao.82 Tan clarified that 
“what we are against is not socialism itself, but the distortion of socialism.”83 
In other posters, Tan mentioned the crisis of Marxism. He said, “Marxism is an 
objective truth, not a religion. Those who assert themselves as Marxist and prohibit others 
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from speaking are anti-Marxism.”84 He was sensitive in his awareness that Marxism in China 
had been revised, even though he still believed in real Marxism. In contrast to Tan’s 
aggressive posters, he spoke like a gentleman with his Hunanese accent. No matter how 
others shouted at him, he maintained his smile and politeness.85 He was the most famous 
student activist in Beijing University, though he reflected many years later, “Throughout my 
life, I had only two months to care about politics – between mid May and mid July of 
1957.”86  
 
2. Debates and Speeches 
Till the night of May 20, students were not satisfied only with writing posters, but 
included other tactics in their repertoires: speeches and debates at the “Democratic Plaza.” 
They brought tables from the dining halls, and set them up as podiums. Anyone could go on 
to make a speech within a limited time, while others waited in line.87 Sometimes two students 
stood on stage debating, surrounded by crowds in circles.88 René Goldman has a vivid 
description of the scene: “At times students stood in tight knots around speakers at other 
places on the campus, creating an atmosphere which reminded one of Hyde Park in 
London.”89 Both the “big character poster” and “big debate” created in the movement were 
highly applauded and even written into the 1975 Constitution,90 because in some way they 
provided a space for “free speech,” which had to be in accordance with the Party, and 
exemplified “people’s democracy,” as the public had such a channel to participate in politics. 
Another prominent student, thanks to her passionate speeches, was Lin Xiling, a law 
student at the nearby People’s University. This institution trained Party cadres from peasant 
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or worker background. The composition of its student body reflected that purpose: “nine 
percent young model industrial workers; fifty-one percent revolutionary cadres with three to 
eight years of practical revolutionary experience; forty percent intellectuals who had already 
graduated from special political courses.”91 Before attending People’s University, Lin joined 
the military and then worked as a journalist for China Youth, when she witnessed people’s 
lives at the bottom of the society.92 Lin was sponsored for studying at the university by the 
military, who paid her fees, but she acted as a maverick, which attracted the attention of top 
officials. As the newspaper China Youth later wrote of her, “her rightist utterances were for a 
time all the rage among young people throughout the country, particularly university 
students.”93  
Lin visited Beijing University for the first time to see the big character posters. After 
she returned to People’s University, she gave a speech criticizing Stalin and the Party’s 
“leftist” policies. On May 23, Lin was invited to Beijing University to give a talk on similar 
topics.94 During the “airing of grievances” period of the movement, she made six speeches at 
the two universities.95 She compared the different atmospheres between the two schools, 
which again associated contemporaneous Beijing University students with those in 1919. She 
said,  
I am very excited today to be able to breathe the fresh air of Beijing 
University. The People’s University is a great beehive of dogmatism 
with too heavy a bureaucratic atmosphere. Peita [Beijing University], 
after all, is Peita and inherits the traditions of the May Fourth 
movement.96   
 
After her opening remark, the first issue Lin touched on was the sensitive Hu Feng 
case. She questioned whether Hu was a counterrevolutionary, because what Hu demanded 
was conceded and practiced in the Hundred Flowers. As Lin asked, 
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Hu Feng held different views on socialist realism; now that a hundred 
schools of thought are contending, aren’t there many people who hold 
different views? … If Hu Feng’s program were proposed today, he 
would not be spoken of as a counterrevolutionary.97  
 
 Many students at Beijing University echoed Lin’s opinions on Hu Feng. As some 
pointed out, “Hu Feng's only crime was to have wanted ‘blooming and contending’ too 
early.”98 Students put up posters demanding an open court for his case, if not his release, 
asking the Party to prevent such cases from recurrence.99  
Another controversial issue Lin talked about was her views of Stalin’s personality cult 
and its relation to socialism: 
The cult of personality is a product of the social system. … Marxism 
tells us that all social phenomena have their social and historical origins. 
The problem of Stalin is not the problem of Stalin the individual; the 
problem of Stalin could only arise in a country like the Soviet Union, 
because in the past it had been a feudal, imperialistic nation. China is 
the same, for there has been no tradition of bourgeois democracy. … 
The socialism we now have is not genuine socialism; or if it is, our 
socialism is not typical. Genuine socialism should be very democratic, 
but ours is undemocratic. I venture to say our society is a socialist one 
erected on a feudal foundation; it is not typical socialism, and we must 
struggle for genuine socialism!100  
 
Among the students, there had been many discussions about whether Stalin’s 
personality cult was associated with the socialist system. In Mao’s articles he denied the 
concurrence as inevitable, but his argument was not convincing to the students, though no 
one dared to openly doubt it.101 Now using Marxist categories, Lin openly argued that the 
personality cult had originated within Soviet socialism, and with the same system, China 
might have the same problem. Lin even criticized Chinese socialism for its feudal elements 
and lack of democracy. No one had ever said or heard such bold criticisms, and no matter 
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whether her opinions were right or wrong, she shared some new perspectives with other 
students, who had not considered such questions before.102 
Like Tan Tianrong, Lin also explored how the Party treated dissidents: 
 
When you disagree with the leadership, you are opposed to the 
leadership; to be opposed to the leadership, is to be opposed to the 
organization; to be opposed to the organization is to be anti-Party; to be 
anti-Party is to be opposed to the people; to be opposed to the people is 
counterrevolutionary. Applying this formula in rendering a verdict is 
nothing but the method of Stalin.103 
 
Lin constantly compared the problems in China to Stalinism, but she made a distinction 
between Mao and Stalin. Lin and most students still respected Mao. She acknowledged that 
Mao made a small mistake on the Hu Feng case, and that a personality cult did exist in China, 
but she did not associate Stalin with Mao, or viewed them as sharing the same problem.104 
While the students felt that Mao supported them, in fact Mao was no longer on the same side 
as the students. 
As a veteran journalist, Lin noticed that the authorities attempted to suppress the media 
in order to deceive the people. She said,   
During the tempest of the revolution, Party members stayed together 
with the people; but after the victory of the revolution, they climbed up 
to the ruling position and ideological limits were imposed. They want to 
suppress the people; they adopt policies aimed at deceiving the people. 
Actually, this is the most foolish of methods. Now they block the news. 
For example, why do the newspapers not report on such a dynamic 
movement at Beijing University?105  
 
Soon after May 19, many journalists came to view the posters at Beijing University, but 
almost no newspapers reported on the student movement, which was isolated and kept from 
spreading out of the campus.106 The government controlled most newspapers, and thus the 
flow of information. The silence of the People’s Daily irritated the students, who petitioned 
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the Beijing Municipal Committee, asking why there was no coverage of the movement at 
Beijing University. One official replied in a harsh tone: “The People’s Daily is our Party’s 
newspaper, so we decide what we want to publish. If you want our newspaper to promulgate 
your wrongheaded thoughts, that is absurd!”107 The only newspapers publishing favorable 
accounts of the student movement were the Guangming Daily and Wen Hui Bao on May 26 
and 27, because they were under the control of democratic parties and the intellectuals.108 
 Lin also described the Party cadres’ privileges based on her own experiences: 
Some Party members rushed to join the Party in order to enjoy the 
resultant privileges; those who do not join the Party have no future. 
Someone asked me to join the [Communist Youth] League, saying that 
if I did not join the Party or the League, how could I manage to settle 
my future, marriage, and rank? Hearing this, I was very angry. I will 
never join the League for this reason [emphasis in the original].109  
 
According to René Goldman, the privilege of Party cadres was a common student 
criticism. Many posters exposed the personal immorality of Party cadres, who were 
considered as “the new class.”110 In a famous poster “On the Development of Classes,” Qian 
Ruping, a student from a poor peasant family, wrote: 
The experience of the past seven years has proved that it is not so 
beautiful; a new class oppression is just building up. . . . Following the 
destruction of the old classes, a new class has emerged, which is 
naturally different from the old ones, but has nevertheless 
characteristics of its own.111  
 
In 1957, the Party had been governing for only eight years, but some students were 
already aware of the emergence of a new class. In retrospect, the problem of Party privilege 
did not disappear but got even worse, just as the students in 1957 had foreseen. In Lin’s 
speeches in 1957, as well as in later years, she epitomized the role of an intellectual, who is 
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never satisfied with social reality but always brings a critical eye to it. A famous quote from 
her was: 
If I were to live in “X” society five hundred years from now, I would be 
dissatisfied, for society is progressive. If we are satisfied with the 
existing society, there will be no further development. Had the apes 
been content with reality, we would not be humans today.112  
 
The same attitude was found in other posters. In Qian Ruping’s “On the New 
Development of Class,” he asked, “Are we looking ahead toward a slave society or toward a 
more rational one?”113 They both exemplified the role of intellectuals as the society’s 
conscience, and their critiques were not only toward the Communist regime, but also for the 
sake of a better future. 
Not everyone agreed with Lin; on the contrary, Lin’s speeches polarized the students at 
Beijing University. Some students applauded her, asked for her autographs or took photos 
with her, while others debated with her, shouted at her or wrote insulting notes to her.114 Lin 
lived in controversy throughout her life, regardless of wherever she went. 
 
3. Journals  
Since 1949, all publications were controlled by or affiliated with the Party, which gave 
no chance for independent journals to exist. During the student movement, the newly 
established “Hundred Flowers Society,” a student organization initiated by several student 
activists such as Tan Tianrong, Chen Fengxiao and Zhang Jingzhong, founded a student-run 
journal, which they named The Square, as a reference to the plaza at Beijing University, 
where big character posters and students speeches and debates were to be found.115 The 
journal was intended to accept submissions from all students, and also from thoughtful and 
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well-known big character posters. Journals were more advantageous than posters in that they 
were easier to carry around, whereas posters had to be read in one particular place. Journals 
could also be saved for the future, but posters might be covered over, removed or swept away 
by rains.  
The Square envisioned a free space for students to voice their opinions. On the one 
hand it differentiated its language from official propaganda, but on the other hand it still 
supported the Hundred Flowers Campaign. As the forward stated, 
Our “Square” is a real “wide” “space,” a forum for all speeches that are 
not detached from socialism. For the purpose of “Truth, Kindness and 
Beauty,” the square is open to all songs in all tones for the youth! Our 
“Square” is open for the airing of all views, a place for the hundred 
flowers to bloom!116  
 
“A wide place open for all views” summarizes the purpose of this journal, and one can 
see how these active students interpreted the Hundred Flowers policy. There was no 
discrimination against certain thoughts, and no “poisonous weeds,” because everything was 
welcomed here. 
The Square attracted attention both from students and university officials, and it 
inevitably encountered problems with funding and publishing. Without support from 
university officials, Tan and his friend, Chen Fengxiao, another student activist, sold all their 
books and belongings except for their blankets and the clothing they wore to finance the 
venture. They also asked for donations from students, when they put up a banner “save the 
child” at the main dining hall.117 The “child” here refers to the journal, and the banner 
adopted the same title as an essay written by Lu Xun, the most influential Chinese author of 
the twentieth century. In that essay, he denounced the Chinese society and the family system 
for ruining the children, the future of China.  
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 When the students sent their drafts and papers to the printer of the Workers’ Daily, 
they were asked to pick them up a week later. But when they returned, the workers attacked 
them and confiscated their drafts, because many articles were found to include anti-Party, 
anti-socialist speeches. According to a letter written by the workers to the students,  
Our workers think we only gain happiness and freedom through the 
Communist Party and socialism. Today’s socialism is so great, much 
better than before. The Communist Party and socialism are embedded 
in our destinies, and our proletariat class will not acknowledge whoever 
is against the Party and slanders it.118 
 
The students suspected that it was the university and local officials who had intervened 
with the printers, and nothing would change their minds about printing the journal.119 But that 
was an assumption, because there was no evidence to prove whether the workers truly 
disagreed with the students or the officials had coerced them. When the students failed to 
publish the journal through letterpress printing, their alternative was to use mimeograph. It 
was during the Anti-Rightist Campaign that the journal was finally published, when the 
atmosphere already shifted to repression, and a large number of the copies were burnt in the 
square in front of the dining hall.120  
The Square was not the only journal on campus in 1957, but it was the only one that 
claimed independence from leadership of Youth League or Party officials. Another journal, 
Hong Lou, was under the guidance of Youth League, and it experienced no trouble with 
budget or publishing.121 During the student movement, in pursuit of reflecting the real 
situation on campus, it adopted a neutral position by including comments from both 
“rightists” and their opponents. In the fourth issue of 1957, an editorial announced that it 
would develop struggles on two lines: one was anti-“rightists,” and the other was supporting 
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the Hundred Flowers campaign by airing sympathetic criticism.122 University officials 
condemned its “neutrality” as a mistake of “bourgeois objectiveness,” which meant it “lacked 
a sharp class standpoint and willingness to fight, and seemed like an outsider but not a 
participant.”123 In January 1958, Hong Lou was restructured and admitted that their journal 
served as a tool for the Party propaganda.124 
Afterwards, the journal’s editors suffered as “rightists,” including a female Chinese 
major named Lin Zhao. Later on her name signified the cruelty of the Cultural Revolution, 
when the state charged her mother five cents for bullet fees for her execution. During the 
student movement in 1957, she differentiated herself from other student activists. As a Youth 
League member, Lin supported Party leadership without suspicions or critique. At the same 
time, she disagreed that the Party represented pure truth or everything that was perfect. Thus, 
she struggled between following Party disciplines and listening to her own conscience.125  
One journal that fully embraced the Party’s views on the Anti-Rightist Movement was 
Lang Tao Sha, which not only attacked “rightists” but also people in the middle. In other 
words, it targeted journals like The Square and Hong Lou. It accepted the Party as the sole 
leader on the way to socialism, and it argued that there was no need for liberalization of 
thoughts, but instead promoted a continuing thought reform campaign.126 As the Anti-
Rightist Movement progressed, Lang Tao Sha stood out as a party-supporting journal, which 




As Jeffrey Wasserstrom has pointed out, “the social world of the Chinese campus was 
highly organized and structured by a complex network of formal and informal group 
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affiliations that bound students to their classmates and provided a foundation for political 
mobilization.”127 Different from colleges in the West, Chinese universities had formal student 
groups based on majors and years at school, and the students with the same major in the same 
class were usually well acquainted with each other since they took classes or had political 
studies together for several years. As a reflection of this fact, the work, Collection of Rightist 
Students’ Thought at Beijing University, is organized in the terms of the students’ majors and 
years in college.  
During the student movement, the students who wrote posters did not know those 
outside their own departments. As Chen Fengxiao, who later became an organizer of a 
student group, remembered, he thought it would be better to found a coalition among the 
students and have a uniform voice for student opinion. He contacted some activists in each 
department, and at a secret meeting they came up with the idea of starting an organization. 
One of the participants was Tan Tianrong, who suggested calling the group “Hegel-Engels 
School,” but most students disagreed and later “Hundred Flowers Society” became the 
name.128 It was probably the first student organization since 1949 not organized under Party 
auspices.129 Besides the vague ideas of publishing a journal and keeping correspondence, 
they did not have any clear principles or program to follow. 
Without leaders and goals, the loosely constructed organization was doomed to fail. 
However, the students at the time were optimistic. As Wang Shuyao reflected, 
Among the students, there would not be a leader; what mattered the 
most were personality and individual views. There was no organization 
if there was no leader, and there was nothing to fear if there was no 
organization. This was a democratic movement, which should exclude 
leaders. There were continuously updated core figures, but not leaders. 
The democratic movement excluded individual authority.130 
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The Hundred Flowers Society did not function like an organization, and active students 
did not identify themselves as student leaders. If there was any type of mobilization among 
the students, it should be due to the Hundred Flowers policy and Mao’s incessant 
encouragement. No one at that point expected the mobilization could turn out to be a “trap.” 
After the Anti-Rightist Campaign replaced the Hundred Flowers Campaign, joining the 
Society became one of the rightist students’ crimes, and the most outspoken students were 
deemed as student leaders, though they had self-consciously rejected such roles. 
From Chen’s memoirs, we learn that one of the activities of the Society was to reach 
out to other universities in Beijing and Tianjin. They were eager to share their experiences 
during the movement at Beijing University, but were not always welcomed to do so. On May 
26, when Qinghua University was holding a collegiate sporting event, a few students from 
Beijing University went there to introduce the movement to the Qinghua campus. 
Unexpectedly, they were attacked and expelled from the school’s grounds.131 The Society 
selected five student representatives, including Tan, to visit a few colleges in Tianjin, but 
each of them had different opinions in terms of what ideas to introduce. Some students also 
went to the Beijing Normal University to ask for a coalition in support of a student of 
strike.132 Most of these efforts were unsuccessful, which made Beijing University more 
isolated from other schools in the region. 
Even within Beijing University, the students were not unified. They split into three 
major groups. As René Goldman observed, 
There were students openly expressing their dissatisfaction and also 
some taking the Party stand (probably mainly Party and Youth League 
members and other activists). However, we can assume that the 
majority of the students stood somewhere in between, displaying a 
whole range of feelings from utter confusion and hesitation to semi-
approval and unexpressed sympathy, an attitude which might be termed 
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“wait and see.”133  
 
The movement was a stage for the students who spoke the loudest, either criticizing or 
justifying the Party, but in fact both of them were minorities. There were still a large number 
of students who remained silent for different reasons. Qian Liqun, one of the first scholars to 
study this particular student movement, was among the majority then, and he echoed Rene 
Goldman’s views. Some students had learned their lesson from previous campaigns, and 
decided not to criticize the Party no matter how Mao encouraged them to do so. Some 
students disagreed with the extreme views of some posters, but thought it was their right to 
exercise free speech, which should not be suppressed. Some other students had never thought 
of those political questions and had never been interested in politics, thus they had nothing to 
say. All these students were classified as in the “middle,” which seemed like the safest and 
least criticized stance. However, later in a campaign to “unmask hidden rightists,” even these 





When Sidney Tarrow discusses the relationship between frames and social identities, he 
argues that “natural, or inherited, identities are often the basis of aggregation in social 
movements.”135 In 1957, the students at Beijing University consciously presented themselves 
as drawing on the May Fourth heritage. As the editors of The Square wrote,   
Beijing University is the home to the May Fourth Movement, and the 
students at Beijing University are descendents of the May Fourth 
students. Our veins are filled with the blood from the May Fourth 
Movement. In the socialist May Fourth period, we need to learn from 
our May Fourth Movement predecessors, their spirits of courageous 
questioning and creativity. We are endeavoring to pursue real socialist 
democracy and culture!136 
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Despite the students’ highly charged emotions, the movement in 1957 was not 
equivalent to the events in 1919. An immense gap existed between what the students desired 
to achieve and what the students actually influenced. Tarrow states that “much of the ‘work’ 
of framing is cognitive and evaluative – that is, it identifies grievances and translates them 
into broader claims against significant others.”137 What can be said of the movement in 1957 
is that the students indeed claimed some broad frames when they imagined potential goals of 
the movement. As one article in The Square said, 
This democratic movement is mainly based on the premise of 
supporting socialism, a bottom up political movement for enlarging 
socialist democracy. It is the enlightenment that the youths get rid of all 
restraints and achieve thought liberation. It is the prelude of the Eastern 
Renaissance.138  
 
The students certainly had grand visions of their movement, and if given a longer time 
and a wider space, the movement might reach out to more colleges and influence more 
students’ minds. Nevertheless, within the short amount of time and a limited space on 
campus, the students’ ideals were nothing more than illusions. Another crucial factor was that 
the students were facing a much more omnipotent “opponent:” the Party. It was not 
appropriate to name it an “opponent,” because the students wished to justify themselves as 
helping the Party instead of opposing the Party. As Chen Fengxiao wrote in a poster, 
We not only try to help the Party with the Rectification Campaign, but 
beyond that, we need to further enlarge the scope of democracy. These 
two are intrinsically inseparable. … We are making group activities, but 
what we are making are democratic groups, not anti-Party groups. We 
are attacking the Party leaders in our school, because their bureaucratism 
is too severe. If this kind of bureaucratic atmosphere continues, it is hard 
to say whether they still represent the Party. Attacking bad Party 
members is not equal to attacking the Party.139 
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The students sought to help the Party, or more directly, college Party officials, with 
sympathetic criticism, but unfortunately the Party leadership misunderstood the students. At 
the same time, the students did not accurately sense the shifting focus from liberalization to 
repression, but imagined that the Party was their ally. Originally, Mao sought, in part, to 
rectify lower-level cadre behaviors through this campaign, which presumably included 
university-based cadres. Later when the criticism proved too widespread and difficult to 
channel, the Party leadership shifted the focus and reassessed the campaign. All these shifts 
took place through discussions among higher-level Party officials, and the public, including 
the students, had no inkling of the shift until the Anti-Rightist Campaign approached all of a 
sudden.  
When the Hundred Flowers Society was founded, a student said, “This movement is in 
the interest of the Party, and the Central Committee sympathizes with us.”140 Such wishful 
thinking was obvious in Tan’s “poisonous weeds” posters as well, as he assumed, “We are 
responsible to support the top-down Rectification Campaign. It seems like our dear comrade 
Mao is in a difficult situation, and our responsibility is to lead the bottom-up democratic 
movement to the least destructive path.”141 These student activists frequently used the phrase 
“bottom-up democratic movement,” and they shared the consensus that it was the best way to 
respond to the top-down Rectification Campaign. 
While the students were busy with posters and speeches, both the Party Central 
Committee and university officials deliberately kept quiet. As Mao ordered in late May, 
“When the rightists attack, our policy is, listening but not speaking. … Do not inform Youth 
League members, Party members or Party secretaries. Let them fight and make up their own 
minds.”142 Based on this instruction, many people concluded that Mao set up an “open trap” 
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before the Anti-Rightist Campaign started. Many students were curious about the university 
officials’ attitude toward their movement, but officials remained silent. 
Not until June 8, 1957, did the Party signal a change in course, with a short editorial in 
People’s Daily entitled “What Is This For?” which warned people that class struggles still 
existed during the campaign, and there were “rightists” who sought to overthrow the Party.143 
From then on, the Hundred Flowers Campaign moved onto the second stage, known as the 
Anti-Rightist Campaign.144 The People’s Daily finally reported on the movement at Beijing 
University, but not in the tone that the students anticipated. On June 21, an article directly 
criticized the Hundred Flowers Society as a reactionary clique, and their journal The Square 
as a reactionary publication.145 It enraged the students, who could not fathom such attacks 
and felt they had been deceived. Based on the official judgment, Beijing University started its 
own Anti-Rightist Campaign.146  
 The language in the forward of the brochure Look! What Kind of Talk Is This? reveals 
how Party and university officials framed the students’ actions: 
We also find that the rightists, in the guise of helping the Party in this 
rectification, have circulated certain destructive statements hostile to 
socialism and the Party. They have attempted to mislead the masses onto 
an evil and criminal road and have utilized the criticism campaign [to 
attempt] to realize their objectives of overthrowing the People’s 
Democratic Dictatorship and denying Party leadership.147  
 
Most student activists were charged with writing reactionary posters, organizing a 
reactionary group – the Hundred Flowers Society, and publishing a reactionary journal – The 
Square. Usually “rightist” students underwent criticism sessions among the students in the 
same department, and only the most famous “rightist” students were granted the “privilege” 
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to be condemned at campus-wide meetings. The students were not completely unacquainted 
with the Party’s tactics and its duplicitous nature. As one poster said, 
Some people always clamor for the development of the May Fourth 
spirit, but when the youths actually hold up their torches, these people 
become scared and shout, “Why not follow the way of ‘gentle breeze 
and fine drizzle?’” They quickly bring forth accusations of going 
against the Party and being counterrevolutionary!148  
 
It was not the first time that the Party applied incriminating charges against the 
intellectuals. The characteristic that made the case in 1957 peculiar was that the intellectuals 
only expressed their criticism after constant invitations from Mao. Therefore, many students 
thought speaking out was to follow Mao’s instruction, without realizing that the authorities 
possessed the power to welcome as well as to reject criticism.   
 
Political Opportunities and Constraints 
 
As Tarrow argues, “Contention is more closely related to opportunities for – and 
limited by constraints upon – collective action than by the persistent social or economic 
factors that people experience.”149 This proposition fits well with the movement of 1957, 
which was both mobilized and soon suppressed by the authorities. Even though the students 
had various dissatisfactions with the Party, which arose from their previous experiences, they 
would not dare express them explicitly until given the opportunity. The key political 
opportunity in this movement came from Mao’s launching the Hundred Flowers Campaign. 
Likewise, the constraint arose from Mao’s decision to transform the focus of the campaign 
from Party cadres to their critics. 
 In contrast to other authoritarian regimes that discourage popular politics, China in the 
Mao period witnessed numerous political movements that encouraged the participation of the 
masses. Mao seemed to be particularly fond of mobilizing the people to struggle against each 
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other, and he believed that only after total chaos could there come order.150 Most times the 
movements were under the Party’s domination, but in 1957, the Hundred Flowers policy 
backfired. The intellectuals’ grievance and bitterness terrified Mao, who was convinced that 
things got out of hand and a “Hungarian-style uprising” could occur.151 The policy remained 
ambiguous in several ways. When Mao called for all points of views, he did not tolerate 
challenges to socialism or to Party leadership. When he used terms like “fragrant flowers” or 
“poisonous weeds,” he left space for interpretation to the people, but eventually, only his 
version of interpretation was correct. 
More elusively, Mao’s attitude toward the movement had been reshaped by the 
developments of the movement. Originally he was confident that criticism would not damage 
the Party’s reputation, and there was no chance for a “Hungarian incident” in China. 
However, after May 14, terms like “inclined-rightist” and “anti-Communist” appeared in 
documents from the Central Party Committee. One such document ordered that,  
Our local newspapers should continue to cover speeches from people 
outside the Party, especially speeches from inclined-rightists and anti-
Communists. We must report in its original form without trimming, so as 
to let the masses know their faces. It is good for educating the masses 
and people in the middle.152  
 
 This was a signal that Mao’s focus was shifting from the liberalization to repression. 
Superficially, newspapers were still allowed to publish critiques, but it was no longer for the 
sake of helping the Party, but instead for exposing “poisonous weeds.” On the next day, Mao 
wrote another article, “Things Are Changing,” circulated among top leaders yet not available 
to the public until 1977. For the first time in the Hundred Flowers period, Mao raised the idea 
of “rightist” activities in the movement. 
Rightists make up one, three, or five to ten percent, depending on the 
situation. Recently, in democratic parties and higher institutions, the 
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rightists displayed the most determination and rampancy. … Now the 
attack from the rightists has not reached its peak yet … we still need to 
let them be rampant for a while, to reach their pinnacle. The more 
rampant they are, the more favorable to us.153 
 
From these words, one could draw the conclusion that Mao was setting up a trap, and 
“waiting for the snake to come out of the cave.” Letting the “rightists” criticize did not mean 
to sincerely hear what they said and correct them when they went wrong, but rather to reveal 
how “poisonous” these people were. At this point, Mao still differentiated between “rightists” 
and genuine criticism. It might seem contradictory, but Mao wrote, 
Most people’s criticisms are reasonable, or basically reasonable, 
including those perceptive criticisms that are not published in the 
newspaper, such as the one from Professor Fu Ying at Beijing University. 
Their purpose of criticizing is hoping to improve the mutual relationship 
[between intellectuals and the Party]. Their criticisms are sympathetic. 
But criticisms from the rightists are ill willed, because they have 
hostility.154 
 
Mao acknowledged that many critics had good intentions, but how to classify these 
criticisms as sympathetic or ill-willed was murky. However, Mao was confident about one 
thing: “rightists” would not successfully influence the majority of the students to join with 
them. As he argued,  
You know many college students are descendents of landlords, rich 
peasants and bourgeois, who might be attracted to the rightists. A part of 
those students with ideas that incline to the right might [follow the 
rightists], but to attract the majority of the students, that is a fantasy.155 
 
Mao did not doubt that the students from “wrong” family background would have 
“wrong” thoughts. However, what happened as the student movement began at Beijing 
University after he wrote the article was completely unexpected. They spontaneously started 
criticizing bureaucratism and challenging Party leadership, even without influence from the 
democratic parties’ politicians or other “rightists.” Mao was enraged and disillusioned by the 
intellectuals, including the students. In an address to the Communist Youth League on May 
                                                        






25, he warned against the wrong direction the campaign was taking: “Any speech or action 
which deviates from socialism is entirely wrong.”156 Later in the Anti-Rightist Campaign, he 
calculated the quota of “rightists” at Beijing University, 
Beijing University has more than 7,000 people, but the rightists are only 
one, or two, or three percent among all. What does it mean by one, or 
two, or three percent? It means those determined backbones that always 
make trouble and seek to turn things upside down. These are only around 
fifty people, less than one percent. The other one or two percent of 
people are applauding and supporting them.157 
 
As it turned out, the number of students who were criticized as “rightists” at Beijing 
University reached 800, nearly ten percent of all students, many more than Mao imagined.158 
Obviously Mao was not in charge of those petty details as to which student should be labeled 
as “rightist;” that was the responsibility of the university officials. During the student 
movement, it was their hesitance and ambivalence that provided opportunities for the 
students. Like the students, university officials at first attempted to respond to Mao’s initial 
calls for blooming and contending, and tolerated students’ speeches and posters. 
The students initiated the movement by writing big character posters without 
negotiating with university officials, thus they were not guaranteed support from the 
beginning. This also left the university officials room to maneuver as the political conditions 
changed. On the night of May 19, at the campus-wide Youth League members’ meeting, the 
college Party deputy secretary said, “Big character posters are not the best way. We neither 
support them nor are against them.”159 This cautious statement annoyed the students, who 
wished to hear a definite answer. Then the following night, the secretary corrected the 
previous night’s statement, claiming that “big character posters are an effective way to raise 
suggestions, and the college Party committee fully supports them.”160 After that, many 
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students devoted their time to writing posters even in class. After Lin’s speech of on May 23rd, 
even though the school did not announce a suspension of classes, nobody went to class, and 
finals had to be rescheduled.161  
At the same time, the university Party committee remained silent. Every day some 
students ran to the committee office, asking for their opinions on certain issues the posters 
brought up. At a secret meeting with Party leaders, the secretary explained, “Based on 
instructions from above, the Party committee will not take a stance. We want to see how 
chaotic the world will be under the Communist Party’s control. Communist members and 
Youth League members, you need to swim in the sea and set the direction yourselves.”162 The 
university officials were temporizing, waiting to see which way the wind blew, so that they 
could move in either direction.  
The majority of the students were left in a blind state, not realizing the real intention of 
either the university officials or the Party. They still believed that both Mao and the 
university officials agreed with their movement, and their actions were nothing but helping 
with the Party’s Rectification Campaign. Many students expressed on their posters that the 
Campaign was not an “opportunity” to speak out, but rather that a democratic authority 
should offer a regular channel for expressing public opinions. As one poster said, “I do not 
consider the Rectification Campaign as a bestowal from above. Just the opposite, I think this 
is a means all political parties with a bit of common sense would employ. The ruling regime 
needs to gratify people with democracy and freedom.”163 The idealism reflected in these 
words would eventually collide with the harsh reality of Party control. 
 
A Tragic Ending  
 
At Beijing University, the Anti-Rightist Campaign lasted from the summer of 1957 
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until January 1958. As Rene Goldman writes, “the students did not go home as usual during 
holidays, but instead took part in endless rounds of ‘struggle meetings’ designed to get the 
‘rightists’ to confess their ‘crimes’.’’164 Besides endless meetings, more political studies were 
introduced into the curriculum in the fall of 1957, such as a course on “Socialist Ideological 
Education” scheduled for eight hours a week.165 
As for those labeled “rightists,” some of the most active ones, about twenty to thirty 
students and teachers, were tried and imprisoned, and around a hundred were sent to “reform 
through labor,” while others stayed at school under supervision.166 The different treatment 
was according to Mao’s instructions. As he wrote, 
Expelling leaders of strikes and student strikes, this is a bourgeois 
method; in general [they] shouldn’t be expelled. … Why should we help 
the incorrect ones? They should be kept as “instructors.” Because [they] 
have committed errors, [say] a few individuals have been identified as 
spies, should they be kicked out of school? I think let [them] study, just 
so long as they’re not active criminals.167  
 
Mao’s instructions sounded benevolent, but he was not the one to carry them out. All 
“rightists” from Beijing University were isolated once they were labeled, and many suffered 
in prisons or labor camps, including five who were executed.168 The book Beijing University 
Chronicles (1898 - 1997), records the number of “rightists” at the school. As of January 31, 
1958, Beijing University had 589 students and 110 faculty and staff, altogether 699 people 
classified as “rightists.”169 The section on 1982 says that 716 rightists were criticized at 
Beijing University during the Anti-Rightist Campaign.170 According to the People’s Daily in 
an article published after the end of the Cultural Revolution, Beijing University had classified 
715 “rightists,” and there were 842 “uncapped rightists” who received all kinds of 
punishment. At that time, the total number of students at Beijing University was 8,983, and 
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faculty and staff amounted to 1,399. That means seven percent of all the school’s population 
were denounced as “rightists.”171  
At the time when Mao came up with the idea that “rightists” were using the campaign 
to attack the Party and felt “things are changing” around May 15, Beijing University students 
had not started their own movement yet. Except for a few top Party leaders who learned of 
Mao’s shifted focus, most ordinary people were not aware of the shift. Besides that, Mao also 
did not expect to include students in the Hundred Flowers Campaign. So the tragic part was, 
without knowing Mao’s intention, the students voluntarily exposed themselves as targets of 
the campaign against “rightists.” 
It seems inevitable that the student movement was doomed to failure in 1957. Under 
the Communist regime, even the democratic parties’ politicians had succumbed and accepted 
the fact of being “rightists,” not to mention the students. There was a tremendous power 
imbalance between the Party and the students, and in such an illiberal state, any individual or 
group that tried to challenge the authorities would risk their lives doing so. The tragedy in 
1957 was that no students or other intellectuals who raised criticism were thinking to 
overthrow the Party; rather they were expressing their genuine concerns about the country, 
with the permission of the Party. As a graduate student in the 1950s later vividly described, 
“Nothing hurts more than to mean well and get kicked in the teeth. … The Communist party 
could have had our loyalty for free, and they just wasted it. They could have put our brains to 
good use, but just threw them away.”172 The sense of being cheated and a sense of 
uselessness spread among the intellectuals, who had no ways of contributing their wisdom to 
the country they loved. 
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 Mao interpreted those criticisms as challenges to the power of the Party, but he 
overestimated the potential resistance. The active students were loosely organized with no 
clear goals to achieve and no leaders to follow. The Hundred Flowers Society existed in 
name, but was not politically strong. Many students had ambivalent opinions during the 
movement, as they were neither willing to speak out, nor willing to suppress others’ right to 
criticize. The student efforts were not strong enough to bring their collective actions onto the 
level of contentious politics. 
Ultimately, the Hundred Flowers Campaign did not, and was not allowed to spread 
from the intellectuals to the masses. The liberal policy mainly involved the intellectuals and 
students, without extending to the workers or peasants.173 Though some students were 
conscious of the potential problems of Party leadership and socialism in China, the other 
groups might not share the same feelings, as revealed by the conflict between some students 
and printers for publishing the student journal. Without support from all walks of life, the 
movement did not last long and was easily suppressed. 
                                                        




Chapter 3: Reflections on the Past 
 
 
After the death of Mao and the end of the Cultural Revolution, if there was any 
consensus among Party leaders and ordinary people, it was that such human disasters like the 
Cultural Revolution could not take place ever again. Everyone, including victims and 
victimizers during previous political movements, was searching for ways to come to terms 
with the unbearable past. The Party composed a document evaluating Mao and his political 
campaigns after 1949, which briefly mentioned the Hundred Flowers and the Anti-Rightist 
Movement. It caused controversy among “rightists,” because it only recognized the problem 
of the Anti-Rightist Movement as excesses in implementation, but maintained its overall 
correctness, despite the fact that most “rightists” were “rectified” after 1978. When top 
officials started reforming the Party and the country under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, many 
problems they identified were identical to the ones the students discussed in 1957. In other 
words, the reformers, who were originally criticizers of the students, implicitly endorsed the 
students’ earlier criticisms and carried them out through the reforms. In memoires written by 
the students of the time, most avoid touching on the movement in 1957, considering its 
sensitivity, while a few express their inner conflicts and regrets.  
 
Official Reevaluation of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and its Controversies 
 
History turned to a new chapter after the death of Mao, especially after the power 
transition to Deng Xiaoping, who initiated wide-ranging economic reforms, but very limited 
political ones. He reoriented the political focus from class struggle among Party leaders and 
ordinary people to bringing wealth into the country and opening China to the world. Despite 
that, an inescapable challenge he had to tackle was the evaluation of Mao and his catastrophic 




 In a speech titled “Current Situation and Task” made on January 16, 1980, Deng spoke 
about the Anti-Rightist Movement:  
The problem was that along with the development of the movement, it was 
extended to a wider scope and the scope of the attack was too large. Most 
people were indeed handled inappropriately. They were treated unfairly for 
many years, and thus were not able to exercise their talents and wisdom for 
the people. This is not only their own personal loss, but also the loss of the 
whole country. Therefore, taking off the “caps” of all the “rightists,” 
correcting the judgment made by the majority, and distributing them 
appropriate jobs are all very necessary and important political measures. 
However, we cannot jump to the conclusion that there was no anti-socialist 
ideological trend in 1957, or such trend should not be attacked. In all, the 
Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957 itself was not wrong, but the problem was 
the amplification of it.174 
 
Deng fully sympathized with those innocent “rightists,” recognized their suffering and 
promised to correct the mistakes of the movement. Yet he, nevertheless, insisted on the 
existence of the anti-socialist trend and the correctness of the initial campaign. In other 
words, there had been fewer “rightists” and they should have been criticized, but the blows 
should not have been as extensive or harsh. Deng’s judgments may have reflected the fact 
that as Party General Secretary in 1957, he had been in charge of the Anti-Rightist Campaign. 
On June 27, 1981, the significant government document, entitled “Resolution on 
Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of 
China,” echoed Deng’s view. Four thousand party leaders and theoreticians drafted the 
document over the course of fifteen months, and Deng repeatedly revised it with detailed 
“suggestions.”175 The document reviewed and evaluated Mao’s historical role in the 
revolution and in the People’s Republic of China, which recognized his contributions as well 
as mistakes, but avoided total denunciation as Khrushchev did to Stalin. In regard to 1957, 
the document praised the Hundred Flowers policy and credited it with remarkable influences: 
These measures spelled out the correct policy regarding intellectuals and their 
work in education, science and culture and thus brought about a significant 
advance in these fields. Owing to the Party’s correct policies, a fine quality of 
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work and the consequential high prestige it granted among the people, the 
vast numbers of cadres, masses, youth and intellectuals earnestly studied 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and participated 
enthusiastically in revolutionary and constructive activities under the 
leadership of the Party, so that a healthy and virile revolutionary morality 
prevailed throughout the country.176  
 
Besides lauding accomplishments since 1949, the document admitted to “serious faults 
and errors,” including in the Anti-Rightist Campaign that followed the Hundred Flowers:   
In the rectification campaign a handful of bourgeois Rightists seized the 
opportunity to advocate what they called “speaking out and airing views in a 
big way” and mounted a wild attack against the Party and the nascent socialist 
system in an attempt to replace the leadership of the Communist Party. It was 
therefore entirely correct and necessary to launch a resolute counter-attack. 
But the scope of this struggle was made far too broad and a number of 
intellectuals, patriots and Party cadres were unjustifiably labeled “Rightists," 
with unfortunate consequences.177 
 
The document reiterated what Deng previously mentioned in his speech, that the Anti-
Rightist Campaign was entirely correct and necessary, but the only mistake was its broad 
scope and the numbers unjustifiably labeled “rightists.” The remaining ambiguous questions 
were how broad should be counted as broad and how many people exactly were mislabeled.   
Chen Fengxiao, a student “rightist” at Beijing University in 1957, disagreed with the 
official decision. He pointed out that it was not rightists who were “speaking out and airing 
views in a big way,” but Mao himself.178  When Mao summoned the masses to criticize the 
Party, people were afraid to participate initially. Only after Mao repeatedly stressed that 
people should be more courageous, did people become more critical, but then Mao reversed 
this view by saying he set the trap to draw the snake out of its hole. Another point Chen 
discovered was that Deng actually took charge of the campaign in 1957, thus he could not 
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completely condemn it. If he did, to a certain extent he would discredit himself by admitting 
his mistake.179  
Ironically, Deng was not the first one asserting that the Anti-Rightist Campaign was too 
large in scope, but Lin Xiling already figured out that problem as early as 1957. In a letter 
Lin wrote to Deng in June 1980, she claimed that she brought up the critique “when the 
campaign was in full swing.” As she wrote: 
 It has been borne out by reality that my contention before the party in 1957 
that “the Anti-Rightist Campaign has overreached itself” has proved to be 
true and by no means a mistaken notion nor crime in the nature being of a 
“rightist” or “counter-revolutionary.” The unfortunate thing was its being 
presented prematurely.180  
 
 Similar to the fate of many other suggestions raised by “rightists” in 1957, it turned out 
to be correct decades later, even though those “rightists” underwent innumerable tragedies for 
decades because their opinions were considered to be counter-revolutionary. While history 
saw some suggestions go from wrong to right, Lin reflected on her initial thoughts but came 
to a stronger conclusion: 
The campaign conducted in 1957 not only overreached itself, but had been 
wrong and inappropriate all along. … If we grant the existence of that 1 
percent of “rightists,” was there enough justification to launch an Anti-
Rightist Campaign of such proportion as to engulf directly up to one million 
culprits and implicate indirectly a countless number of innocents? … I hold it 
both deceiving and self-deceptive to ornament the Anti-Rightist Campaign 
with the festoons of “appropriateness” and “necessity.”181  
 
The statement that most innocent “rightists” were rectified also indicates that there still 
remain a few “rightists” who are not rectified, including some of the most celebrated 
democratic party leaders, and student leaders like Lin. As she understood the intentions of the 
Party,   
In order to make the festoons of “appropriateness” and “necessity” stick for 
political reasons, there must be a certain number of “rightists” left 
uncorrected and unredressed to serve as a “showcase” or a “sample” 
                                                        
179 Chen, Meng duan Weiming hu, 312. 
180 Lin Xiling, “Letter to Comrade Deng Xiaoping,” Chinese Law & Government 17, no. 4 (1, 1984): 28. 




(unfortunately, I have been so selected). … I wonder if there is also a definite 
proportion or quota in the correction of “rightists,” too, and if a definite 
number of “rightists” must be left uncorrected.182 
 
Lin was viewed as the epitome of a student “rightist,” who might be even more well 
known than the “May 19th Movement” at Beijing University itself. She felt her fame as a 
target rightist “was blown up out of all proportion by the propaganda machine, which made 
me a celebrity through repeated repudiations.”183 Implicated even indirectly in her case, 170 
people were labeled “rightists” in Beijing.184 
At an academic conference in memory of the fiftieth anniversary of the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign in 2007, Lin showed up and gave enthusiastic speeches. She still vividly 
remembered the day when she visited Beijing University, 
I was extremely busy, but out of curiosity as a journalist, an author and a law 
worker, I went to Beijing University [to see their posters]. … That night, 
there was a debate between the students majoring in physics and in law about 
whether Hu Feng was an anti-revolutionary. I was particular sensitive about 
that topic. Some law students argued that Hu was an anti-revolutionary. The 
physics students did not understand law, and asked me a favor to speak for 
them. I was very hesitant, and said I was there to listen, not to speak. But 
without my consent host announced ‘welcome Lin Xiling, a law student at 
People’s University and a young author, to speak.’ I was utterly unprepared, 
and was pushed onto the stage. Half a century later, I still cannot get off the 
stage.185 
 
Being a famous “rightist” was not what she wanted, as we can see from her very first 
speech. She did not consider herself anti-Party, anti-socialist and a “rightist,” but instead 
claimed herself to be a mere leftist.186 Lin presented her consistently critical personality, 
which had not been erased after all these years. She ventured to speak what she thought, 
without contemplating the consequences for herself. In her later years, she offered 
perspicacious critiques wherever she went around the world, especially in Taiwan and 
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France. In September 2009, she passed away in Paris, and her “rightist” identity was still 
unrectified. 
 
Criticizers Acknowledge the Criticisms 
 
What the students discussed in 1957 and what the Party leaders concluded based on 
historical lessons might be different, but in some major areas, they were similar and 
compatible. Examples include the idea that some of the problems that occurred while 
developing socialism had to do with the system of implementing it; the insistence on carrying 
out democratic reforms of the system, and fighting against over-centralized power, privileges, 
and unequal relationships between leaders and ordinary people; and the suggestion to extend 
socialist democracy and strengthen the socialist legal system.  
After Deng came to power in 1978, one of his urgent tasks was to learn the lessons 
from the catastrophes in Mao’s period, especially the Cultural Revolution, in order to bring 
the country back on track economically and politically, instead of lingering “on the verge of 
breaking down.” In his August 18, 1980 speech “On the Reform of the System of Party and 
State Leadership,” Deng summarized the problems that plagued the current system, including 
“bureaucracy, over-concentration of power, patriarchal methods, life tenure in leading posts 
and privileges of various kinds.”187 Deng mentioned China’s feudal autocratic tradition and 
lack of democratic legality,188 which almost sounded like Lin Xiling in 1957, when she 
delivered spontaneous speeches at Beijing University and People’s University. Deng also 
touched upon the personal privileges of Party cadres who regarded “themselves as masters 
rather than servants of the people.”189 The same topic was popularly debated and posted in 
1957, such as Qian Ruping’s poster on the “new class.” 
                                                        







In Deng’s speech, he traced the problems of the Party back to the system, in part to 
problems of leadership and organization, as he said: 
It is true that the errors we made in the past were partly attributable to the 
way of thinking and style of work of some leaders. But they were even more 
attributable to the problems in our organizational and working systems. … I 
do not mean that the individuals concerned should not bear their share of 
responsibility, but rather that the problems in the leadership and 
organizational systems are more fundamental, widespread and long-lasting, 
and that they have a greater effect on the overall interests of our country.190 
 
Deng’s views resonate with student critiques in 1957 when they claimed that the origin 
of the bureaucratism, sectarianism and subjectivism was the system, which should be 
strengthened by democracy and the legal system. That same suggestion appeared twenty 
years earlier than what Deng had said in 1980.  
In terms of over-concentrated power, he reflected that: 
Over-concentration of power is liable to give rise to arbitrary rule by 
individuals at the expense of collective leadership, and it is an important 
cause of bureaucracy under the present circumstances. … Moreover, the 
power of the Party committees themselves is often in the hands of a few 
secretaries, especially the first secretaries, who direct and decide everything. 
Thus “centralized Party leadership” often turns into leadership by individuals. 
… Over-concentration of power is becoming more and more incompatible 
with the development of our socialist cause. The long-standing failure to 
understand this adequately was one important cause of the “Cultural 
Revolution,” and we paid a heavy price for it. There should be no further 
delay in finding a solution to this problem.191  
 
Over-concentration of power pointed to Mao’s personality cult, though Deng did not 
and would not express the point explicitly. Deng considered it to be one of the contributing 
factors of the Cultural Revolution, but over-concentrated power existed long before that 
catastrophe. Wang Shuyao, a Beijing University student in 1957 wrote a poster warning 
people of the danger of over-concentrated power: 
At any time, over-concentrated power, no matter whether in an individual, or 
in a self-claimed always glorifying and correct and great clique, is extremely 
dangerous. It is a hundred times more dangerous when the masses are 
stupefied and fooled! Because if the clique makes severe mistakes or changes 
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its ideological nature, there is no other strength powerful enough to conquer 
it!192 
 
Because of this poster, Wang was no longer a good student leader, but a “counter-
revolutionary rightist.” Now reviewing what he wrote after more than fifty years, he felt 
ashamed by his naïve writing, but also sad because history unfortunately followed what he 
said.193 He noticed the similarities yet differences between him and Deng: 
Only after China had been cleansed by fire and blood, did Deng express the 
view that the power cannot be concentrated in one person, because it is 
dangerous in that way. But I, twenty years earlier, which was 1957, said: over 
concentration of power is dangerous. I said it twenty years early, and I was a 
rightist; Deng said it twenty years later, and Deng was a national leader.194 
 
The students were perceptive in foreseeing the problems of the Party and state. 
However, many people in 1957 did not realize the importance of the problems some students 
discussed, because those problems had yet to become obvious. At that time, many people 
blindly followed whatever the Party instructed. Thus, the active students had to sacrifice for 
their foresight, which was treated as “anti-Party and anti-socialist” thoughts in 1957, and they 
were severely punished. Then in the 1980s, these ideas became the guidelines of Chinese 
reform, and concepts like democracy and rule of law were widely accepted. No one 
anticipated that the criticizers of those “rightists” could eventually accept their thoughts, and 
to some extent even actualize their thoughts.195 Officially, there was no acknowledgement of 
connections between the student movement in 1957 and the top-down liberalization in the 
1980s, and most people would not even realize what was practiced in the reform had been 
raised as early as 1957. Certainly, there are challenges to carrying out these concepts, but at 
least nobody will denounce them as “counter-revolutionary” today.196 
                                                        
192 Wang Shuyao, “Lessons from Stalin’s Mistakes,” in Beijing Daxue youpai fandong yanlun huiji, 67. 
193 Wang, Yanyuan fengyu zhu rensheng, 81. 
194 Ibid., 19. 
195 Qian, Jujue yiwang, 8. 




Despite the similarities, the students and Deng brought up the problems in completely 
different circumstances, and thus had varied scales of influences. First, the students noticed 
the advent of personality cult and Party privileges eight years after the founding of People’s 
Republic, when the problems were by no means severe, while Deng realized the severity of 
these problems after they had reached an extreme in the Cultural Revolution. If the students 
and other intellectuals’ critics had been heard in 1957, the following disasters might have 
been avoided. Second, the students had no political interests or plans to challenge the 
authorities, because they were speaking their minds without considering potential 
consequences, while Deng confronted the urgency to evaluate Mao’s legacies and reform the 
regime, so as to maintain the legitimacy of Party leadership. Third, due to tight political 
constraints, the student grassroots movement had limited influence beyond the campus or 
outside Beijing, while Deng’s reform was carried out around the country and has transformed 
China.    
 
Coming to Terms with the Past 
 
A school’s anniversary is a key moment for alumni to reunite and reminisce about their 
college years. The centennial of Beijing University fell in 1998. During all the festivities and 
ceremonies no mention was made of the student movement in 1957. It seemed as if nothing 
had happened at the university in 1957, no nationally influential big poster movement, no 
hundreds of incorrectly labeled “rightists,” no people sent to “reeducation through labor” or 
sentenced because of being “rightists,” and no people who died as a result. Nothing had 
happened, no pursuit of democracy or the truth, or sacrifice for such a pursuit. It was a blank 
space.197 As one participant remembered, on the day of the centennial, “we talked about those 
good old days, but it seemed all limited to before the Anti-Rightist Campaign. It made sense 
                                                        




though, because it’s hard to talk about such things afterward.”198 It is a period of 
embarrassing and heartbreaking history, which nobody is willing to dig into it. 
Then what do Beijing University students think of that movement in 1957 today? A 
partial answer to that question can be found in a collection of essays written by a group of 
alumni of the class of 1955 at their fortieth year anniversary. They all majored in Chinese 
language and literature at school. Most of the contributions were not “rightists,” but did 
participate in the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Understandably, many of them did not mention or 
just briefly touched upon the student movement in 1957, and the following campaigns, as a 
bitter episode among other enjoyable moments. Despite that, some of the accounts are worth 
comment. 
 A common feeling shared among several students is a sense of conflict and dilemma. 
As one put it, 
On the one hand, we answered the call of the Party. With the revolutionary 
excitement, we passionately and angrily criticized the “rightists” and 
“bourgeois academic authorities.” With the “revolutionary storm,” we gained 
competence through struggle. On the other hand, affected by the ultra-left 
trend formed in and outside of the Party, and our ignorance, sometimes we 
thought we were righteous, but in fact we were emotionally biased and 
unintentionally hurt our classmates and teachers.199 
 
At that time, everyone, including the “rightists,” believed in the Party and was actively 
involved in whatever the Party required. There were simply no other choices. Only in 
hindsight did the participants realize that they were puppets directed by the Party and that 
they hurt their peers inadvertently. People today no longer share the same “class struggle” 
mentality as decades ago, and it now seems incredible that they truly believed the ideology at 
that time. The time and disillusion of the Party enable people to reconceive themselves as 
outsiders. 
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Some people might not have realized their roles as victimizers until afterward, but some 
others were conscious about their inner conflicts at the time. As Xie Mian, another editor of 
Hong Lou, reflected on a similar dilemma as Lin Zhao,  
I responded to the call of the Party, and against my will to criticize those 
“rightists” who were classmates and friends I privately admired them for their 
talent, wisdom and courage to fight. At the same time, what I criticized was 
exactly what I felt deeply in my soul. With such inner depression and extreme 
conflict, I was unwillingly but irresistibly pushed into that big struggling 
swirl. Due to my own need for self-protection, or in order to present my 
“determination,” I “consciously,” or more exactly, against my will, did what I 
was supposed to do and could do.200   
 
There were a number of students who held different views from those the Party 
indoctrinated, but were afraid to speak publicly for fear of the consequences. For the sake of 
self-protection, they stood in the same stance as others who criticized “rightists,” even though 
they had mental reservations. No matter in which situation, criticizers acted as victimizers to 
those “rightists,” though they themselves were victims of the political movement as well. 
However, it is up to these criticizers to take responsibility for hurting their peers, instead of 
attributing it to politics. As one former student wrote of the past, 
During that time, our generation had done wrong things, stupid things, silly 
things and hurtful things, but we cannot cover them up and avoid talking 
about them by one excuse: these were all caused by the time. Though, in 
essence, I was the same as many other students, and did not intend to hurt our 
brothers and sisters, and I sincerely believed whatever the Party instructed us 
to do. Nevertheless, I was more active than others, and those simple, ignorant, 
repetitive and violent criticisms did not hurt others on purpose, but they 
pushed the wave of political struggle that hurt other students. Such behavior 
was unforgivable for my morality and conscience. Now we are stepping into 
our senior years, and looking back to those youthful years, I bear the 
inescapable responsibility for doing things wrong for that generation.201  
 
It is high time today to hear regrets and apologies from victimizers of those political 
movements decades ago, and most notably, the Red Guards who practiced violence in the 
Cultural Revolution. Everyone who lived through the Maoist period was a victim of those 
political movements, though someone who should be innocent suffered more because of 
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others who followed the majority. When everything turns to the past, it is difficult for victims 
to figure out who to blame, and an apology actually does not matter much to the victims, but 
more to the conscience of the victimizers. The students in 1957 now have reached their 70s, 
thus it is up to them whether they wish to take their grievances or regrets to the grave, or 
decide how to come to terms with the past. 
 During the Anti-Rightist period, high tensions and pressures spread around the 
campus. To those who wrote posters, they anxiously waited for the day to be labeled as 
“rightists.” To the rest, they were afraid to say anything wrong, and tried to follow the Party 
as closely as possible. Another alumnus recalled the relief when the Anti-Rightist Campaign 
ended, 
Now I seem to no longer feel the weight of all the burdens on my shoulders, 
which does not matter whether they stay or not. But they remind me of those 
thrilling days, when you were scared every day, not knowing when the 
disaster would come down upon your head. Finally, there was a day when the 
school announced that there were no more “rightists,” and then you hid 
yourself in a corner that nobody could find, and burst out crying.202 
 
Not everyone actively participated in the movement, and in contrast, quite a lot people 
remained silent. Some even “escaped” the movement by studying in the library, which at 
least two students mentioned in a similar reflection: 
I did not raise any objection [during the Hundred Flowers], not because I had 
foresight knowing that it was “fishing” or “waiting for the snake.” I really did 
not have any good suggestion to make, and I paid all my attention to 
studying. Now in retrospect, I should thank myself. If not for plunging into 
the sea of books, but being outspoken just as the others were, it would be hard 
to predict my fate afterward.203 
 
 Some stayed uninvolved in the movement by remaining silent. For the sake of 
security, some actively participated in the movement by keeping the same tone as the 
authorities. Some others, who offered criticisms of the Party, became victims. As a 
spontaneous grassroots movement initially mobilized by Mao, the students did not 
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speak in unison but presented a variety of voices. Their different positions then have 








People around the world were shocked by the crackdown at Tiananmen Square in 1989 
on the student-initiated movement gathered there. In contrast, very few people know about 
the activities of Beijing University students during the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1957, 
which was actually the beginning of student activism after 1949. The students voiced their 
dissent through a variety of means during that fleeting liberal period, and as a result some of 
the most outspoken students suffered as “rightists” for the rest of their lives. Opinions and 
suggestions from the students were seen as attacking socialism and the Party, and not until 
after the Cultural Revolution did the second generation of leaders learn the lesson and begin 
reforms, which shared almost the same spirit as the students pointed out more than twenty 
years ago. 
Many reasons contribute to the loss of the historical memory of the student movement 
in 1957. First, censorship on researching or publishing books related to the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign discourages scholars from research and participants from writing memoirs. The 
archives covering that period are not open to the public, thus keeping primary resources, 
especially personal and official records, out of reach. However, numerous compilations of 
“rightist” comments, originally published as targets of criticism, now become the best 
available primary resources. However, not all of them are credible, due to exaggeration in the 
process of compilation by people who opposed those comments. From a historical 
perspective, not all of them are valuable either, because many were merely personal opinions 
about specific officials. Serious debates and critiques appeared among the recorded views 
mainly involve democratic parties’ members and college students.  
Second, the negative connotations associated with the category “rightist” still exist 
despite official recognition of mislabeling. In government documents, the majority of 




respect. Among intellectuals, there is a sense of honor attached to the label “rightist,” which 
has not been shared by the whole society yet.204 As a result, many “rightists” try to hide their 
past, and very few are willing to talk about it today. Being survivors, they would rather enjoy 
a peaceful life than get involved in politics again. Thus they inadvertently cooperate with the 
authorities, which hope to erase history of this period when they committed so many errors 
and injustices. 
Third, contemporary China, including the government and its people, tends to look 
forward instead of backward, and enjoys economic prosperity instead of learning historical 
lessons. Influenced by the social atmosphere, Chinese college students today care more about 
their individual futures, rather than uncovering the past. It seems to most people that the past 
has already passed, and today follows a completely different script, which makes history 
inapplicable and irrelevant. It is a common mentality that China has already borne too many 
historical burdens, and only if we get rid of them can we move on to the future. Then why 
bother digging into this history, if nobody cares? As the student movement in 1957 indicates, 
the problems they criticized have not been improved but deteriorated after over twenty years, 
and the authorities accepted and even adopted some criticisms. 
The student movement at Beijing University in 1957 has long been ignored for all these 
reasons. Unlike other officially sanctioned memories, this movement falls out of the memory 
hole, and is not even included in the school narrative. Nevertheless, looking back to the 
students’ posters and speeches, we can still feel their emotions, get inspired by some 
provocative thoughts and make connections with the present. The student movement at 
Beijing University in 1957 deserves a wider audience, and hopefully this paper contributes to 
that effort.   
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